Salvamento de voto

salvamento de voto conjunto, respecto de la sentencia SU-141 de 2020.Fecha ut supra,ALEJANDRO LINARES CANTILLOMagistradoANTONIO JOSÉ LIZARAZO OCAMPOMagistradoJOSÉ FERNANDO REYES CUARTASMagistrado ---pies de página--- Radicado No. 11001600070620160080000 (cdno. 1, fls. 1 a 36). Cdno. reservado, CD

1. Id. Id. Id. Id. Ley 906 de 2004, artículo 155: “Publicidad. Las audiencias preliminares deben realizarse con la presencia del imputado o de su defensor. La asistencia del Ministerio Público no es obligatoria. // Serán de carácter reservado las audiencias de control de legalidad sobre allanamientos, registros, interceptación de comunicaciones, vigilancia y seguimiento de personas y de cosas. También las relacionadas con autorización judicial previa para la realización de inspección corporal, obtención de muestras que involucren al imputado y procedimientos en caso de lesionados o de víctimas de agresiones sexuales. Igualmente aquella en la que decrete una medida cautelar”. Cdno. reservado, CD

1. Cdno. reservado, CD

1. Cdno. 1, fls. 1 a

36. Cdno. de revisión 1, fl.

190. Id. Id. Id. Id. Id. Id. Id. Id. Cdno. 1, fls. 57 a

58. El Tribunal indicó que “la pretensión consignada en la demanda va encaminada a obtener el mismo resultado que la medida provisional, por lo cual acceder al decreto de esta última podría constituir un acto de prejuzgamiento”. Cdno. 1, fls. 52 a

55. Cdno. 1, fls. 57 a

58. Id. Cdno. 1, fls. 63 a

66. Cdno. 1, fls. 68 a

70. En particular, mediante dichos trinos fue publicada la siguiente información del proceso: “Juzgado 22 de Garantías: inician audiencias preliminares contra director de la cárcel Modelo y otros funcionarios, por presuntos actos de corrupción al interior del penal” (cdno. 1, fl. 69), y “Juzgado 22 de Garantías: cobijados con medida de aseguramiento intramural César Ceballos, director de la cárcel Modelo y 4 personas más, por presuntos vínculos de corrupción para beneficiar a algunos reclusos” (cdno. de revisión 1, fl. 362). Cdno. 1, fls. 79 a

81. Cdno. 1, fls. 89 a

91. Cdno. 1, fls. 98 a

100. Cdno. 1, fls. 110 a

120. Cdno. 1, fl.

134. Cdno. 1, fls. 142 a

158. Asimismo, cdno. 2, fls. 8 a

18. Id. Cdno. 1, fls. 163 a

170. Cdno. 2, fls. 5 a

6. Cdno. 2, fls. 20 a

24. Cdno. 2, fls. 26 a

32. Cdno. 2, fls. 33 a

62. Durante el proceso de selección se recibieron 6 solicitudes de selección presentadas por: (i) los periodistas accionantes (cdno. de revisión 1, fls. 1 a 27); (ii) la Corporación Excelencia en la Justicia (cdno. de revisión 1, fl. 28); (iii) Fescomunicación (cdno. de revisión 1, fls. 29 a 31); (iv) la Flip (cdno. de revisión 1, fls. 33 a 39); (v) la Asociación Colombiana de Medios de Información, AMI, (cdno. de revisión 1, fls. 41 a 45); y (vi) la Defensoría del Pueblo (cdno. de revisión 1, fls. 46 a 49). Cdno. de revisión 1, fls. 50 a

70. Cdno. de revisión 1, fls. 101 a

107. Cdno. de revisión 1, fls. 101 a

107. En particular, el magistrado ponente solicitó informes a: (i) los periodistas accionantes, (ii) el Juzgado 22, (iii) la Fiscalía 23, (iv) la Flip, (v) la Sala Administrativa del Consejo Superior de la Judicatura, (vi) Fiscalía General de la Nación, (vii) la Procuraduría General de la Nación, (viii) el coordinador del centro de servicios judiciales del sistema penal acusatorio de Paloquemao, (ix) el Colegio de Jueces y Fiscales de Bogotá, (x) la Corporación Excelencia en la Justicia, (xi) la Relatoría Especial para la Libertad de Expresión, (xii) Asomedios, (xiii) la Fundación Karisma, (xiv) la Asociación Colombiana de Medios de Información (AMI), (xv) la federación Colombiana de Periodistas (Fecolper), (xvi) Reporteros Sin Fronteras y (xvii) a varios medios de comunicación televisiva y radial. Se recibieron los siguientes informes: (i) Juan Carlo Giraldo (cdno. de revisión 1, fl. 73); (ii) Flip (cdno. de revisión 1, fl. 76); (iii) Mauricio Barbosa (cdno. de revisión 1, fls 78 a 82); (iv) Andrés Felipe Espejo Valencia (cdno. de revisión 1, fls. 84 a 86); (v) Nubia Constanza Sánchez Castro (cdno. de revisión 1, fls. 90 a 94); (vi) Juan Carlo Giraldo (cdno. de revisión 1, fls. 172 a 174); (vii) Florencio Sánchez (cdno. de revisión 1, fls. 175 a 178); (viii) Leonidas Medina Jiménez (cdno. de revisión 1, fls. 185 a 186); (ix) Juez 22 Penal Municipal con Función de Control de Garantías de Bogotá (cdno. de revisión 1, fls. 188 a 197 y cdno. reservado, CD); (x) Fiscal 23 Seccional de la Dirección Especializada contra la Corrupción (cdno. de revisión 1, fls. 222 a 223 y cdno. reservado, fls. 1 a 48); (xi) Consejo Superior de la Judicatura (cdno. de revisión 1, fls. 224 a 225); (xii) Fiscalía General de la Nación (cdno. de revisión 1, fls. 230 a 239); (xiii) procuradora 4 Judicial II Apoyo a Víctimas del Conflicto Armado (cdno. de revisión 1, fls. 258 a 259); (xiv) Asomedios, Corporación Excelencia en la Justicia y AMI (cdno. de revisión 1, fls. 261 a 264); (xv) Caracol Televisión (cdno. de revisión 1, fl. 265); (xvi) RCN Televisión (cdno. de revisión 1, fls. 269 a 273); (xvii) Flip (cdno. de revisión 1, fls. 311 a 328); (xviii) Defensoría del Pueblo (cdno. de revisión 1, fls. 333 a 335); (xix) Caracol Radio (cdno. de revisión 1, fls. 358 a 360); (xx) Centro de Servicios Judiciales de Paloquemao (cdno. de revisión 1, fls. 362 a 364); (xxi) Colegio de Jueces y Fiscales de Bogotá (cdno. de revisión 1, fl. 366); (xxii) periodistas accionantes (cdno. de revisión 1, fls. 410 a 419); (xxiii) Leonidas Medina Jiménez (cdno. de revisión 1, fls. 420 a 424); (xxiv) Media Legal Defense Initiative (cdno. de revisión 2, fls. 546 a 555 y 575 a 584), y (xxv) Mauricio Pava Lugo (cdno. de revisión 2, fls. 591 a 615). Cdno. de revisión 1, fls. 369 a

371. Cdno. de revisión 1, fls. 423 a

424. Cdno. de revisión 1, fls. 433 a

440. Cdno. de revisión 1, fls. 460 a

461. Cdno. de revisión 2, fl.

565. Cdno. de revisión 2, fls. 561 a

562. Cdno. de revisión 2, fls. 627 a

631. Cdno. de revisión 2, fl.

775. Cdno. de revisión 2, fls. 735 a

737. Cdno. de revisión 2, fls. 671 a

684. Cdno. de revisión 2, fls. 690 a

695. Cdno. de revisión 2, fls. 802 a

803. Cdno. de revisión 2, fls. 791 a

801. Cdno. de revisión 2, fls. 786 a

790. Cdno. de revisión 2, fls. 908 a

913. Cdno. de revisión 2, fls. 832 a

854. Cdno. de revisión 2, fls. 898 a

901. Cdno. de revisión 2, fls. 856 a

868. Art. 86 de la C.P.: “Toda persona tendrá acción de tutela para reclamar ante los jueces, en todo momento y lugar, mediante un procedimiento preferente y sumario, por sí misma o por quien actúe a su nombre, la protección inmediata de sus derechos constitucionales fundamentales, cuando quiera que éstos resulten vulnerados o amenazados por la acción o la omisión de cualquier autoridad pública…” Sentencia T-321 de 2016. Cfr. T-154 de 2017. Sentencia T-369 de 2017. Sentencia T-308 de 2011. Sentencia T-412 de 2008. Sentencia T-412 de 2008. Sentencia SU 771 de 2014. Sentencia T-011 de 2016. Sentencia T-970 de 2014. Sentencia T-038 de 2019 Sentencia SU 522 de 2019. Sentencia T-107 de 2018. Cfr. T-142 de 2016 y T-576 de 2008. Sentencia T-107 de 2018. Sentencia SU 522 de 2019. Cfr. Sentencia T-107 de 2018 y T-011 de 2016. Sentencia SU 522 de 2019. Id. Id. Id. Auto 232 de 2001. Sentencia T-038 de 2019 Sentencia T-391 de 2007. Artículo 19: “Todo individuo tiene derecho a la libertad de opinión y de expresión; este derecho incluye el no ser molestado a causa de sus opiniones, el de investigar y recibir informaciones y opiniones, y el de difundirlas, sin limitación de fronteras, por cualquier medio de expresión”. Artículo 19: “1. Nadie podrá ser molestado a causa de sus opiniones. //

2. Toda persona tiene derecho a la libertad de expresión; este derecho comprende la libertad de buscar, recibir y difundir informaciones e ideas de toda índole, sin consideración de fronteras, ya sea oralmente, por escrito o en forma impresa o artística, o por cualquier otro procedimiento de su elección. //

3. El ejercicio del derecho previsto en el párrafo 2 de este artículo entraña deberes y responsabilidades especiales. Por consiguiente, puede estar sujeto a ciertas restricciones, que deberán, sin embargo, estar expresamente fijadas por la ley y ser necesarias para: a) Asegurar el respeto a los derechos o a la reputación de los demás; b) La protección de la seguridad nacional, el orden público o la salud o la moral públicas”. Artículo 13: “Libertad de pensamiento y de expresión.

1. Toda persona tiene derecho a la libertad de pensamiento y de expresión. Este derecho comprende la libertad de buscar, recibir y difundir informaciones e ideas de toda índole, sin consideración de fronteras, ya sea oralmente, por escrito o en forma impresa o artística, o por cualquier otro procedimiento de su elección. //

2. El ejercicio del derecho previsto en el inciso precedente no puede estar sujeto a previa censura sino a responsabilidades ulteriores, las que deben estar expresamente fijadas por la ley y ser necesarias para asegurar: a) el respeto a los derechos o a la reputación de los demás, o b) la protección de la seguridad nacional, el orden público o la salud o la moral públicas. //

3. No se puede restringir el derecho de expresión por vías o medios indirectos, tales como el abuso de controles oficiales o particulares de papel para periódicos, de frecuencias radioeléctricas, o de enseres y aparatos usados en la difusión de información o por cualesquiera otros medios encaminados a impedir la comunicación y la circulación de ideas y opiniones. //

4. Los espectáculos públicos pueden ser sometidos por la ley a censura previa con el exclusivo objeto de regular el acceso a ellos para la protección moral de la infancia y la adolescencia, sin perjuicio de lo establecido en el inciso 2. //

5. Estará prohibida por la ley toda propaganda en favor de la guerra y toda apología del odio nacional, racial o religioso que constituyan incitaciones a la violencia o cualquier otra acción ilegal similar contra cualquier persona o grupo de personas, por ningún motivo, inclusive los de raza, color, religión, idioma u origen nacional”. Sentencia C-650 de 2003. Sentencia T-391 de 2007. Sentencia T-244 de 2018. Sentencia C-442 de 2011. Sentencia T-155 de 2019. Sentencia T-155 de 2019. Sentencia T-391 de 2007. Sentencia T-145 de 2019. Asimismo, ver las sentencias SU 274 de 2019, T-155 de 2019, T-391 de 2007, entre otras. Sentencia T-256 de 2013. Asimismo, ver las sentencias SU 274 de 2019, T-155 de 2019, T-391 de 2007, entre otras. Id. Id. Id. Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos. Marco Jurídico Interamericano sobre el derecho a la libertad de expresión, 2010. Sentencia T-391 de 2007. Sentencia SU 274 de 2019. Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos. Marco Jurídico Interamericano sobre el derecho a la libertad de expresión, 2010. Sentencia T-391 de 2007. Sentencia T-243 de 2018. Sentencia T-391 de 2007. Sentencia T-391 de 2007. Sentencia T-391 de 2007. Sentencia T-155 de 2019, T-243 de 2018, T-391 de 2007, entre otras. Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos. Marco Jurídico Interamericano sobre el derecho a la libertad de expresión, 2010. Sentencia SU 274 de 2019. Sentencia T-391 de 2007. Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos. Marco Jurídico Interamericano sobre el derecho a la libertad de expresión, 2010. Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos. Marco Jurídico Interamericano sobre el derecho a la libertad de expresión, 2010. Sentencia SU 1723 de 2000. Sentencia T-155 de 2019. Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos. Marco Jurídico Interamericano sobre el derecho a la libertad de expresión, 2010. Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos. Marco Jurídico Interamericano sobre el derecho a la libertad de expresión, 2010. Sentencia T-391 de 2007. Sentencia T-391 de 2007. Declaración de Maputo: “Promover la libertad de expresión, el acceso a la información y la emancipación de las personas”, 2008. Cfr. Declaración de Brisbane: “Libertad de información: el derecho a saber”, 2010. Sentencia T-391 de 2007. Sentencia T-391 de 2007. Sentencia SU 274 de 2019. Id. Id. Sentencia T-155 de 2019. Id. Sentencia SU 274 de 2019. Sentencia SU 274 de 2019. Sentencia T-049 de 2008. Sobre la relación entre publicidad de las actuaciones penales y el derecho a un juicio justo, ver la Sentencia SU 274 de 2019. Sentencia T-049 de 2008. Sentencia T-409 de 2014. Sentencia T-409 de 2014. Sentencia T-259 de 1994. Cfr. Consejo de Europa, Comité de Ministros. Recomendación Rec(2003)13: “The provision of information in relation to court proceedings, and in particular criminal proceedings, corresponds to the right of the public to be informed on matters of public concern, including justice”. Sentencia T-049 de 2008. Sentencia T-049 de 2008. Cfr. Sentencia C-1154 de 2005. Sentencia T-920 de 2008 y C-037 de 1996. Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos. Informe Anual, 2019. Id. http://www.oas.org/es/cidh/expresion/showarticle.asp?artID=87&lID=2 Id. Id. Id. Id. Resolución 67/187 de la Asamblea General de Naciones Unidas. Id. Id. Comité de los Derechos del Niño. Observación General 10 (2002). Sentencia T-075 de 2013. Id. Constitución Política, artículo

20. Sentencia SU 274 de 2019. Sentencia SU 274 de 2019. Sentencia SU 274 de 2019. Sentencia SU 274 de 2019. Sentencia T-219 de 2019. Cfr. SU 274 de 2019. Sentencia SU 274 de 2019. Sentencia SU 274 de 2019. Id. Sentencia SU 274 de 2019. Id. Id. Id. Id. Id. Id. Id. Id. Id. Cfr. Corte Suprema de los Estados Unidos, Press-Enterprise Co. v Superior Court of California, 478 U.S. 1 (1986); Press-Enterprise Co. v Superior Court of California, 464 U.S. 501 (1984); Waller v Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 (1984), y Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v Virginia 448 U.S. 555 (1980). Corte Suprema de Canadá, Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v The Queen, SCC 3 (2011); Vancouver Sun v Attorney General 2 S.C.R. 332 (2004), y Dagenais v Canadian Broadcasting Corp., CanLII 39 SCC (1994). Tribunal Constitucional español, STC 56/2004, STC 57/2004, STC 65/1992, STC 96/1987 y STC 30/1982. Corte Suprema de India, Tripathi v Supreme Court of India 1232 (2017) y Naresh Shridar Mirjakar v State of Maharashtra. 3 S.C.R. 744 (1966). Cámara de los Lores del Reino Unido, Campbell v MGM Ltd. (2004) y Scott v Scott (1913). Corte Suprema del Reino Unido, Khuja v Times Newspapers Limited. UKSC 49 (2017). Corte Constitucional de Sudáfrica, Independent Newspapers (Pty) Ltd. v Minister for Intelligence Services CCT 38/07 (2008); S. v Mamabolo CCT 44/00 (2001), entre otras. “Plainly it would be difficult to single out any aspect of government of higher concern to the people than the manner in which criminal trials are conducted”. Corte Suprema de los Estados Unidos, Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v Virginia 448 U.S. 555 (1980). “The press and general public have a constitutional right of access to criminal trials (…) embodied in the First Amendment”. Corte Suprema de los Estados Unidos, Globe Newspaper Co. v Superior Court for the County of Norfolk, 457 U.S., 596 (1982). En el mismo sentido, la Corte Suprema del Reino Unido ha señalado que: “It has been recognized for many years that the press reporting of legal proceedings is an extension of the concept of open justice, and it is inseparable from it”. Corte Suprema del Reino Unido, Khuja v Times Newspapers Limited. UKSC 49 (2017). “Underlying the First Amendment right of access criminal trials is the common understanding that ‘a major purpose of that Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs’”. Corte Suprema de los Estados Unidos, Globe Newspaper Co. v Superior Court for the County of Norfolk, 457 U.S., 596 (1982). “The justification for the principle of open justice (…) namely the value of public scrutiny as a guarantor of the quality of justice. (…) Its significance has if anything increased in an age which attaches growing importance to the public accountability of public officers and institutions and to the availability of information about the performance of their functions”. Corte Suprema del Reino Unido, Khuja v Times Newspapers Limited. UKSC 49 (2017). En el mismo sentido, la Corte Constitucional de Sudáfrica ha indicado lo siguiente: “Of course this openness seeks to ensure that the citizenry know what is happening, such knowledge in turn being a means towards the next objective: so that the people can discuss, endorse, criticise, applaud or castigate the conduct of their courts. And, ultimately, such free and frank debate about judicial proceedings serves more than one vital public purpose. Self-evidently such informed and vocal public scrutiny promotes impartiality, accessibility and effectiveness, three of the important aspirational attributes prescribed for the judiciary by the Constitution”. Corte Constitucional de Sudáfrica, S. v Mamabolo CCT 44/00 (2001). Id. “More generally, the courts have an inherent power to sit in private where it is necessary for the proper administration of justice. (…) The inherent power of the courts extends to making orders for the conduct of the proceedings in a way which will prevent the disclosure in open court of the name of the parties or witnesses or of other matters, and it is well established that this may be a preferable alternative to the more drastic course of sitting in private”. Corte Suprema del Reino Unido, Khuja v Times Newspapers Limited, UKSC 49 (2017). “Although the right of Access to criminal trials is of constitutional stature, it is not absolute. (…) But the circumstances under which the press and public can be barred from a criminal trial are limited; the State’s justification in denying access must be a weighty one. Where, as in the present case, the State attempts to deny the right of access in order to inhibit the disclosure of sensitive information, it must be shown that the denial is necessitated by a compelling governmental interest, and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest”. Corte Suprema de los Estados Unidos, Globe Newspaper Co. v Superior Court for the County of Norfolk, 457 U.S., 596 (1982). Cfr. Corte Suprema de los Estados Unidos, Press-Enterprise Co. v Superior Court of California, 464 U.S. 501 (1984). Cfr. Corte Suprema de Canadá, Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v The Queen, SCC 3 (2011) Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd. v Ontario, SCC 41 (2005); Vancouver Sun v Attorney General 2 S.C.R. 332 (2004), y Dagenais v Canadian Broadcasting Corp., CanLII 39 SCC (1994); Tribunal Constitucional español, STC 56/2004, STC 57/2004, STC 65/1992, STC 96/1987 y STC 30/1982; Corte Suprema de India, Tripathi v Supreme Court of India 1232 (2017) y Naresh Shridar Mirjakar v State of Maharashtra. 3 S.C.R. 744 (1966); Cámara de los Lores del Reino Unido, Campbell v MGM Ltd. (2004) y Scott v Scott (1913); Corte Suprema del Reino Unido, Khuja v Times Newspapers Limited. UKSC 49 (2017), y Corte Constitucional de Sudáfrica, Independent Newspapers (Pty) Ltd. v Minister for Intelligence Services CCT 38/07 (2008); S. v Mamabolo CCT 44/00 (2001). Corte Suprema de los Estados Unidos de Norteamérica. Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos. Caso Eduardo Kimel vs. Argentina. Sentencia de 2 de mayo de 2008. Serie C No. 177 (2008); Caso Palamara Iribarne vs. Chile. Sentencia del 22 de noviembre de 2005. Serie C No. 135 (2005); Caso Herrera Ulloa vs. Costa Rica. Sentencia de 2 de julio de 2004. Serie C No. 107 (2004); Caso Tristán Donoso vs. Panamá. Excepción Preliminar, Fondo, Reparaciones y Costas. Sentencia de 27 de enero de 2009. Serie C No. 193 (2009); Caso Ricardo Canese vs. Paraguay. Sentencia de 31 de agosto de 2004. Serie C No. 111 (2004), y Opinión Consultiva OC-5/85, serie A No. 5 (1985). Caso Claude Reyes y otros vs. Chile. Sentencia de 19 de septiembre de 2006. Serie C No. 151 (2006). Caso Palamara Iribarne vs. Chile. Sentencia del 22 de noviembre de 2005. Serie C No. 135 (2005). Caso Herrera Ulloa vs. Costa Rica. Sentencia de 2 de julio de 2004. Serie C No. 107 (2004). Caso Tristán Donoso vs. Panamá. Excepción Preliminar, Fondo, Reparaciones y Costas. Sentencia de 27 de enero de 2009. Serie C No. 193 (2009). Id. Caso Palamara Iribarne vs. Chile. Sentencia del 22 de noviembre de 2005. Serie C No. 135 (2005). Caso Tristán Donoso vs. Panamá. Excepción Preliminar, Fondo, Reparaciones y Costas. Sentencia de 27 de enero de 2009. Serie C No. 193 (2009). Id. Sentencias C-102 de 2018, C-009 de 2018, SU 274 de 2019, SU 420 de 2019, T-361 de 2019, T-102 de 2019, T-243 de 2018, T-391 de 2007, entre otras. Caso Eduardo Kimel vs. Argentina. Sentencia de 2 de mayo de 2008. Serie C No. 177 (2008). Caso Herrera Ulloa vs. Costa Rica. Sentencia de 2 de julio de 2004. Serie C No. 107 (2004). Caso Herrera Ulloa vs. Costa Rica. Sentencia de 2 de julio de 2004. Serie C No. 107 (2004). Id. Ver Caso Gomes Lund y otros vs. Brasil. Sentencia de 24 de noviembre de 2010. Serie C No. 219 (2010) y Claude Reyes y otros vs. Chile. Sentencia de 19 de septiembre de 2006. Serie C No. 151 (2006). Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos. Caso Nikolova and Vandova v. Bulgaria. No. 20688/04 (2014); Caso Welke and Bialek v. Polnad. No. 15924 (2011); Caso Belashev v. Russia. No. 28617/03 (2009); Caso B and P v. The United Kingdom. No. 36337/97 y 35974/97 (2001); Caso Reipan v. Austria. No. 35115/97 (2001); Caso Doorson v. The Netherlands. No. 20524/92 (1996); Caso Campbell and Fell v. The United Kingdom. No. 7819/77 y 7878/77 (1984); Caso The Sunday Times v. The United Kingdom. No. 6538/74 (1979); entre otros. Artículo 6.1 del Convenio Europeo de Derechos Humanos. “Administration of justice, including trials, derives legitimacy from being conducted in public (…) There is a high expectation of publicity in ordinary criminal proceedings”. Caso Belashev v Russia. No. 28617/03 (2009). “The public character of proceedings protects litigants against the administration of justice in secret with no public scrutiny; it is also one of the means whereby confidence in the courts can be maintained. By rendering the administration of justice visible, publicity contributes to the achievement of the aim of Article 6 § 1, a fair hearing, the guarantee of which is one of the foundations of a democratic society”. Caso B. and P. v United Kingdom. No. 36337/97 y 35974/97 (2001). “Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society, one of the basic conditions for its progress and for each individual’s self-fulfilment”. Caso Lingens v. Austria. No. 9815/82 (1986). Cfr. Consejo de Europa. Freedom of expression. A Guide to the implementation of article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Human Rights Handbook. No. 2. “the press plays a pre-eminent role in a State governed by the rule of law”. Caso Castells v. Spain. No. 11798/85 (1992). Cfr. Consejo de Europa. Freedom of expression. A Guide to the implementation of article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Human Rights Handbook. No. 2. “It is incumbent on the press to impart information and ideas on matters of public interest”. Caso Thorgeir Thorgeirson v. Iceland. No. 13778/88 (1992). “The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subjected to such formalities, conditions, restrictions and penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection, of the reputation or right of others, for preventing disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary”. Caso The Sunday Times v. The United Kingdom. No. 6538/74 (1979). Id. Artículo 10 de la CEDH. Cfr. Consejo de Europa. Freedom of expression. A Guide to the implementation of article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Human Rights Handbook. No.

2. Id. Id. “State’s interference” must be seen as any form of interference coming from any authority exercising public power and duties or being in the public service, such as courts, prosecutors’ offices, police, any law-enforcement body, intelligence services, central or local councils, government departments, army decision-making bodies, public professional structures. Far from being exhaustive, the above enumeration tries only to picture the possible national authorities whose actions would be capable of limiting the exercise of freedom of expression. It makes no difference for the Court which particular authority interferes with this right; the national government shall be considered as respondent party in all cases brought before the Court in Strasbourg”. Consejo de Europa. Freedom of expression. A Guide to the implementation of article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Human Rights Handbook. No. 2. “their life, liberty or security of person may be a stake, as many interests coming generally within the ambit of Article 8 (art. 8) of The Convention. (…) Contracting States should organize their criminal proceedings in such a way that those interests are not unjustifiably imperilled. Against this background, principles of fair trial also require that in appropriate cases the interests of the defense are balanced against those of witnesses or victims called to testify”. Caso Doorson v. The Netherlands. No. 20524/92 (1996). Consejo de Europa. Freedom of expression. A Guide to the implementation of article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Human Rights Handbook. No.

2. Caso Doorson v. The Netherlands. No. 20524/92 (1996). Asimismo, ver Consejo de Europa. Freedom of expression. A Guide to the implementation of article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Human Rights Handbook. No. 2. (“When such conflict occurs, the Court strikes a balance in order to establish the pre-eminence of one right over the other. The balance of the conflicting interests, one of which is freedom of expression, takes into account the importance of the other”). “Before excluding the public from a criminal proceedings, courts must make specific findings that closure is necessary to protect a compelling governmental interest and limit secrecy to the extend necessary to preserve such interest”. Caso Belashev v. Russia. No. 28617/03 (2009). “The proceedings which the present applicants wished to take place in public concerned the residence of each man’s son following the parents’ divorce or separation. The Court considers that such proceedings are prime examples of cases where the exclusion of the press and public may be justified in order to protect the privacy of the child and parties and to avoid prejudicing the interests of justice”. Caso B and P v. The United Kingdom. No. 36337/97 y 35974/97 (2001). Caso Doorson v. The Netherlands. No. 20524/92 (1996). “The Court therefore accepts that there were sufficient reasons of public order and security justifying the exclusion of the press and public from the proceedings against Mr. Campbell. There was accordingly no violation of Article 6”. Caso Campbell and Fell v. The United Kingdom. No. 7819/77 y 7878/77 (1984). Cfr. Caso Reipan v. Austria. No. 35115/97 (2001). “The proceedings which the present applicants wished to take place in public concerned the residence of each man’s son following the parents’ divorce or separation. The Court considers that such proceedings are prime examples of cases where the exclusion of the press and public may be justified in order to protect the privacy of the child and parties and to avoid prejudicing the interests of justice. To enable the deciding judge to gain as full and accurate a picture as possible of the advantages and disadvantages of the various residence and contact options open to the child, it is essential that the parents and other witnesses feel able to express themselves candidly on highly personal issues without fear of public curiosity or comment”. Caso B. and P. v The United Kingdom No. 36337/97 y 35974/97 (2001). “[The Court] agrees with the Government that to pronounce the judgment in public would, to a large extent, frustrate these aims”. Caso B. and P. v The United Kingdom No. 36337/97 y 35974/97 (2001). “The Court further observes that the City Court did not take any measure to counterbalance the detrimental effect that the decision to hold the applicant’s trial in camera must have had on public confidence in the proper administration of justice”. Caso Belashev v. Russia. No. 28617/03 (2009). Caso Nikolova and Vandova v. Bulgaria. No. 20688/04 (2014). “(…) nor did it contemplate taking measures to counterbalance the effects of the lack of a public hearing, for instance by restricting access to certain documents only or holding just some of the sessions in camera, to the extend necessary to preserve confidentiality of the documents in question”. Caso Nikolova and Vandova v. Bulgaria. No. 20688/04 (2014). Caso Belashev v. Russia. No. 28617/03 (2009). Id. “The Court further looks at the Government’s second argument to the effect that the exclusion of the public was necessary in the interests of justice, in particular, for the safety of the victims and witnesses. The Court observes that the need to protect the safety of victims and witnesses through the exclusion of the public from the trial was first mentioned by the Moscow City Court in its decision of 25 December 2001. The reasons given by the Moscow City Court for holding the hearing in camera were “to guarantee security to the victims, witnesses and other parties to the proceedings, taking into account the character of the charges”. The Court considers these reasons to be regrettably laconic. It would have been preferable to have expanded this element to explain in more detail why the City Court was worried about the vulnerability of certain victims and witnesses or whether and why it was concerned that witnesses and victims could have been deterred. It was also important to explain why the concern for the safety of victims and witnesses outweighed the importance of ensuring the publicity of the trial. Moreover, if the trial court had indeed taken into account certain information, this should have been presented to the parties, in particular the applicant, so that an open discussion of the matter could have occurred (…) The Court notes that the government submitted no documents to show what information had served as a basis for the City Court’s decision”. Caso Belashev v. Russia. No. 28617/03 (2009). Id. Press-Enterprise Co. v Superior Court of California, 478 U.S. 1 (1986); Press-Enterprise Co. v Superior Court of California, 464 U.S. 501 (1984); Waller v Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 (1984); Globe Newspaper Co. v Superior Court for the County of Norfolk, 457 U.S., 596 (1982), y Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v Virginia 448 U.S. 555 (1980), entre otras. “A responsible press has always been regarded as the handmaiden of effective judicial administration especially in the criminal field (…). The press does not simply publish information about trials but guards against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors, and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism”. Nebraska Press Association v Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976). “It is true that unlike a criminal trial, the California preliminary hearing cannot result in the conviction of the accused and the adjudication is before a magistrate or other judicial officer without a jury. But these features, standing alone, do no make public access any less essential to the proper functioning of the proceedings in the overall criminal justice process (….) the preliminary hearing in many cases provides ‘the sole occasion for public observation of the criminal justice system’”. Corte Suprema de los Estados Unidos, Press-Enterprise Co. v Superior Court of California, 478 U.S. 1 (1986). Asimismo, esta corte ha advertido que “the presumption of openness may be overcome only by an overriding interest based on findings that closure is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest. The interest is to be articulated along with findings specific enough that a reviewing court can determine whether the closure order was properly entered”, Corte Suprema de los Estados Unidos, Press-Enterprise Co. v Superior Court of California, 464 U.S. 501 (1984). En otras oportunidades, esta Corte ha admitido que la limitación a la publicidad puede estar justificada en asegurar la correcta administración de justicia (“in some limited circumstances, closure may be warranted. Thus a trial judge may, ‘in the interest of the fair administration of justice, impose reasonable limitations on access to trial’”). Corte Suprema de los Estados Unidos, Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v Virginia 448 U.S. 555 (1980). Id. Sentencia SU 274 de 2019. Cfr. Corte Suprema de los Estados Unidos. Nebraska Press Association v Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976). “The proceedings cannot be closed unless specific, on the record findings are made demonstrating that ‘closure is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest’. (…) If the interest asserted is the right of the accused to a fair trial, the preliminary hearing shall be closed only if specific findings are made demonstrating that there is a substantial probability that the defendant’s right to a fair trial will be prejudiced by publicity that closure would prevent”. Corte Suprema de los Estados Unidos, Press-Enterprise Co. v Superior Court of California, 478 U.S. 1 (1986). “The closure must be no broader than necessary to protect that interest (…). The closure of the entire suppression hearing here plainly was unjustified. The State’s proffer was not specific as to whose privacy interests might be infringed if the hearing were open to the public, what portions of the wiretap tapes might infringe those interests”. Corte Suprema de los Estados Unidos, Waller v Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 (1984). “Any closure of a suppression hearing over the objections of the accused must meet the following test: (…) the trial court must consider reasonable alternatives to closing the hearing”. Corte Suprema de los Estados Unidos, Waller v Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 (1984). En el mismo sentido, “the trial judge made no findings to support closure; no inquiry was made as to whether alternatives solutions would have met the need to ensure fairness; there was no recognition of any right under the Constitution for the public or press to attend the trial, and there was no suggestions that any problems with witnesses could not have been dealt with by exclusion from the courtroom or sequestration during the trial, or that sequestration of the jurors would not have guarded against their being subjected to any improper information”. Corte Suprema de los Estados Unidos, Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v Virginia 448 U.S. 555 (1980). “Although the entry of the order might be read as a judicial determination that other measures would not suffice, the trial court made no express findings to that effect; the Nebraska Supreme Court referred to the issue only by implication”. Corte Suprema de los Estados Unidos, Nebraska Press Association et al. v Stuart Judge et al. 427 US 539 (1976). Cfr. Corte Suprema de los Estados Unidos, Press-Enterprise Co. v Superior Court of California, 464 U.S. 501 (1984) (“”there was also failure to consider alternatives to closure and to total suppression of the transcript. The trial judge should seal only such parts of the transcript as necessary to protect the anonymity of the individuals sought to protect”). “The closure of the entire suppression hearing here plainly was unjustified. The State’s proffer was not specific as to whose privacy interests might be infringed if the hearing were open to the public, what portions of the wiretap tapes might infringe those interests (…) and the court did not consider alternatives to immediate closure of the hearing”. Corte Suprema de los Estados Unidos, Waller v Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 (1984). Id. “Assuming that some jurors had protectible privacy interests in some of their answers, the trial judge provided no explanation as to why his broad order denying access to information at the voir dire was not limited to information that was actually sensitive and deserving of privacy protection. Nor did he consider whether he could disclose the substance of the sensitive answers while preserving the anonymity of the jurors involved. // Thus not only was there a failure to articulate findings with the requisite specificity, but there was also a failure to consider alternatives to closure and to total suppression of the transcript. The trial judge should seal only such parts of the transcript as necessary to preserve the anonymity of the individuals sought to be protected”. Corte Suprema de los Estados Unidos, Press-Enterprise Co. v Superior Court of California, 464 U.S. 501 (1984). “The Massachusetts statute cannot be justified on the basis of either the State's interest in protecting minor victims of sex crimes from further trauma and embarrassment or its interest in encouraging such victims to come forward and testify in a truthful and credible manner. (…) Compelling as the first interest is, it does not justify a mandatory closure rule. Such interest could be just as well served by requiring the trial court to determine on a case-by-case basis whether the State's legitimate concern for the minor victim's wellbeing necessitates closure. Such an approach ensures that the constitutional right of the press and public to gain access to criminal trials will not be restricted except where necessary to protect the State's interest”. Corte Suprema de los Estados Unidos, Globe Newspaper Co. v Superior Court for the County of Norfolk, 457 U.S., 596 (1982). Corte Suprema de Canadá. Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v The Queen, SCC 3 (2011) Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd. v Ontario, SCC 41 (2005); Vancouver Sun v Attorney General 2 SCR 332 (2004); Canadian Broadcasting Group v New Brunswick (Attorney General) SCR 480 (1996); y Dagenais v Canadian Broadcasting Corp., CanLII 39 SCC (1994), entre otras. “This Court has emphasized on many occasions that the ‘open court principle’ is a hallmark of a democratic society and applies to all judicial proceedings”. Vancouver Sun v Attorney General 2 S.C.R. 332 (2004). “Public access to the courts guarantees the integrity of judicial processes by demonstrating “that justice is administered in a non-arbitrary manner, according to the rule of law”. Openness is necessary to maintain the independence and impartiality of courts. It is integral to public confidence in the justice system and the public’s understanding of the administration of justice. Moreover, openness is a principal component of the legitimacy of the judicial process and why the parties and the public at large abide by the decisions of courts”. Vancouver Sun v Attorney General 2 S.C.R. 332 (2004). “The freedom of the press to report on judicial proceedings is a core value. Equally, the right of the public to receive information is also protected by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression”. Vancouver Sun v Attorney General 2 S.C.R. 332 (2004). “Equally, the right of the public to receive information is also protected by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression. The press plays a vital role in being the conduit through which the public receives that information regarding the operation of public institutions. Consequently, the open court principle, to put it mildly, is not to be lightly interfered with”. Vancouver Sun v Attorney General 2 S.C.R. 332 (2004). Cfr. “It is also essential to a democracy, and crucial to the rule of law, that the courts are seen to function openly. The press must thus be free to comment and report upon court proceedings to ensure that the courts are in fact seen by all to operate openly in the penetrating light of public scrutiny. It is only through the press that most individuals can really learn of what is occurring in the courts. The members of the public, as ‘listeners’ or ‘readers’, have a right to receive information pertaining to public institutions, in particular the courts”. Edmonton Journal v Alberta, SCC 20 (1989) “Furthermore, the principle of openness of judicial proceedings extends to the pretrial stage of judicial proceedings because the policy considerations upon which openness is predicated are the same as in the trial stage. Dickson J. found ‘it difficult to accept the view that a judicial act performed during a trial is open to public scrutiny but a judicial act performed at the pretrial stage remains shrouded in secrecy’. Vancouver Sun v Attorney General 2 S.C.R. 332 (2004). “Measures that prevent the media from gathering that information, and from disseminating it to the public, restrict the freedom of the press guaranteed by s. 2 (b). To the extent that such measures prohibit public access to the courts and to information about the courts, they may also be said to restrict freedom of expression in so far as it encompasses the freedom of listeners to obtain information that fosters public criticism of the courts”. Canadian Broadcasting Group v New Brunswick (Attorney General) S.C.R. 480 (1996). Id. “While the test was developed in the context of publication bans, it is equally applicable to all discretionary actions by a trial judge to limit freedom of expression by the press during judicial proceedings”. Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v The Queen, SCC 3 (2011) Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd. v Ontario, SCC 41 (2005); Vancouver Sun v Attorney General 2 S.C.R. 332 (2004); y Dagenais v Canadian Broadcasting Corp., CanLII 39 SCC (1994). “This Court has developed the adaptable Dagenais/Mentuck test to balance freedom of expression and other important rights and interests, thereby incorporating the essence of the balancing of the Oakes test. The rights and interests considered are broader than simply the administration of justice and include a right to a fair trial and may include privacy and security interests”. Vancouver Sun v Attorney General 2 S.C.R. 332 (2004). “When two protected rights come into conflict, Charter principles require a balance to be achieved that fully respects the importance of both rights. A hierarchical approach to rights must be avoided, both when interpreting the Charter and when developing the common law”. Dagenais v Canadian Broadcasting Group. 3 SCR 835 (1994). A publication ban should only be ordered when: (a) Such a ban is necessary in order to prevent a real and substantial risk to the fairness of the trial, because reasonably available alternative measures will not prevent the risk; and (b) The salutary effects of the publication ban outweigh the deleterious effects to the free expression of those affected by the ban (…) there must be a proportionality not only between the deleterious effects of the measures which are responsible for limiting the rights or freedoms in question and the objective, but also between the deleterious and the salutary effects of the measures”. Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v The Queen, SCC 3 (2011) Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd. v Ontario, SCC 41 (2005); Vancouver Sun v Attorney General 2 S.C.R. 332 (2004); y Dagenais v Canadian Broadcasting Corp., CanLII 39 SCC (1994). “The concept of ‘necessity’ has several elements: (1) the risk in question must be wellgrounded in the evidence and must pose a serious threat to the proper administration of justice; (2) “the proper administration of justice” should not be interpreted so widely as to keep secret a vast amount of enforcement information the disclosure of which would be compatible with the public interest; and (3) in order to reflect the minimal impairment branch of the Oakes test, the judge must consider whether reasonable alternatives are available, but he must also restrict the order as far as possible without sacrificing the prevention of the risk”. Dagenais v Canadian Broadcasting Corp., CanLII 39 SCC (1994). A publication ban should only be ordered when: (a) Such a ban is necessary in order to prevent a real and substantial risk to the fairness of the trial, because reasonably available alternative measures will not prevent the risk; and (b) The salutary effects of the publication ban outweigh the deleterious effects to the free expression of those affected by the ban (…) there must be a proportionality not only between the deleterious effects of the measures which are responsible for limiting the rights or freedoms in question and the objective, but also between the deleterious and the salutary effects of the measures”. Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v The Queen, SCC 3 (2011) Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd. v Ontario, SCC 41 (2005); Vancouver Sun v Attorney General 2 S.C.R. 332 (2004); y Dagenais v Canadian Broadcasting Corp., CanLII 39 SCC (1994). Tribunal Constitucional español. STC 56/2004. Cfr. STC 57/2004, STC 65/1992, STC 96/1987 y STC 30/1982. Tribunal Constitucional español. STC 56/2004. Tribunal Constitucional español. STC 56/2004. Cfr. STC 57/2004, STC 65/1992, STC 96/1987 y STC 30/1982. Tribunal Constitucional español. STC 13/1985. Tribunal Constitucional español. STC 56/2004. Tribunal Constitucional español. STC 56/2004. Tribunal Constitucional español. STC 56/2004. “Let us begin by assuming that the petitioners who are Journalists, have a fundamental right to carry on their occupation under Art. 19(1)(g); they have also a right to attend proceedings in court under Art. 19(1)(d); and that the right to freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by Art. 19(1) (a) includes their right to publish as Journalists a faithful report of the proceedings which they have witnessed and heard in court”. Corte Suprema de India. Tripathi v Supreme Court of India 1232 (2017) y Naresh Shridar Mirjakar v State of Maharashtra. 3 S.C.R. 744 (1966). “If the High Court thus had inherent power to hold the trial of a case in camera, provided, of course, it was satisfied that the ends of justice required such a course to be adopted, it would not be difficult to accept the argument urged by the learned Attorney General that the power to hold a trial in camera must include the power to hold a part of the trial in camera, or to prohibit excessive publication of a part of the proceedings at such trial. What would meet the ends of justice will always depend upon the facts of each case and the requirements of justice. In a certain case, the Court may feel that the trial may continue to be a public trial, but that the evidence of a particular witness need not receive excessive publicity, because fear of such excessive publicity may prevent the witness from speaking the truth”. Corte Suprema de India. Naresh Shridar Mirjakar v State of Maharashtra. 3 S.C.R. 744 (1966). “(i) To begin with, only a specified category of cases or cases of constitutional and national importance being argued for final hearing before the Constitution Bench be live streamed as a pilot project. For that, permission of the concerned Court will have to be sought in writing, in advance, in conformity with the prescribed procedure. (ii) Prior consent of all the parties to the concerned proceedings must be insisted upon and if there is no unanimity between them, the concerned Court can take the appropriate decision in the matter for live streaming of the court proceedings of that case, after having due regard to the relevancy of the objections raised by the concerned party. The discretion exercised by the Court shall be treated as final. It must be non-justiciable and non-appealable. (iii) The concerned court would retain its power to revoke the permission at any stage of the proceedings suo motu or on an application filed by any party to the proceeding or otherwise, in that regard, if the situation so warrants, keeping in mind that the cause of administration of justice should not suffer in any manner. (iv) The discretion of the Court to grant or refuse to grant such permission will be, inter alia, guided by the following considerations: (a) unanimous consent of the parties involved, (b) even after the parties give unanimous consent the Court will consider the sensitivity of the subject matter before granting such permission, but not limited to case which may arouse passion or social unrest amongst section of the public, (c) any other reason considered necessary or appropriate in the larger interest of administration of justice, including as to whether such broadcast will affect the dignity of the court itself or interfere with/prejudice the rights of the parties to a fair trial, (v) There must be a reasonable time-delay (say ten minutes) between the live court proceedings and the broadcast, in order to ensure that any information which ought not to be shown, as directed by the Court, can be edited from being broadcast”. Corte Suprema de India. Tripathi v Supreme Court of India 1232 (2017). Corte Suprema de India. Tripathi v Supreme Court of India 1232 (2017). “[T]he limitations of the jurisdiction to impose silence or secrecy must be commensurate with the purpose for which the jurisdiction exists. That purpose is to keep the Court available for the enforcement of rights or the redress of wrongs, and it would not be so available if it could be made a vehicle for publishing the secret after the hearing is over. I think we are driven to say that there is jurisdiction to treat as a contempt of Court any wilful and malicious publication of such a kind as that, if it were known to be allowed, ordinary sensible people would not come to the Court at all”. Cámara de los Lores, Scott v Scott (2013); “While there is no contrary public interest recognised and protected by the law, the press is free to publish anything it likes. Subject to the law of defamation, it does not matter how trivial, spiteful or offensive the publication may be. But when press freedom comes into conflict with another interest protected by the law, the question is whether there is a sufficient public interest in that particular publication to justify curtailment of the conflicting right. In the example I have given, there is no public interest whatever in publishing to the world the fact that the citizen has a drug dependency. The freedom to make such a statement weighs little in the balance against the privacy of personal information”, Cámara de los Lores, Campbell v MGM Ltd (2004). “It has been recognised for many years that press reporting of legal proceedings is an extension of the concept of open justice, and is inseparable from it. In reporting what has been said and done at a public trial, the media serve as the eyes and ears of a wider public which would be absolutely entitled to attend but for purely practical reasons cannot do so”. Corte Suprema del Reino Unido. Khuja v Times Newspapers Limited. UKSC 49 (2017). Artículo

8. Derecho al respeto de la vida privada y familiar: “1. Toda persona tiene derecho al respeto de su vida privada y familiar, de su domicilio y de su correspondencia.

2. No podrá haber injerencia de la autoridad pública en el ejercicio de este derecho salvo cuando esta injerencia esté prevista por la ley y constituya una medida que, en una sociedad democrática, sea necesaria para la seguridad nacional, la seguridad pública, el bienestar económico del país, la defensa del orden y la prevención de las infracciones penales, la protección de la salud o de la moral, o la protección de los derechos y las libertades de terceros”. “The tests which the court must apply are the familiar ones. They are whether publication of the material pursues a legitimate aim and whether the benefits that will be achieved by its publication are proportionate to the harm that may be done by the interference with the right to privacy. The jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights explains how these principles are to be understood and applied in the context of the facts of each case. Any restriction of the right to freedom of expression must be subjected to very close scrutiny. But so too must any restriction of the right to respect for private life”. Cámara de los Lores. Campbell v MGM Ltd. (2004). “These two decisions are the principal English authorities for an approach to the balancing exercise which is fact-specific rather than being dependent on any a priori hierarchy of rights. On some facts, the claimant’s article 8 rights may be entitled to very little weight. On some facts, the public interest in the publication in the media may be slight or non-existent”. Corte Suprema del Reino Unido. Khuja v Times Newspapers Limited. UKSC 49 (2017). Cámara de los Lores, Campbell v MGM Ltd (2004). Trinity Minor and ORS v Croydon Crown Court. Citada en Khuja v Times Newspapers Limited. UKSC 49 (2017). “This systemic requirement of openness in our society flows from the very founding values of our Constitution, which enjoin our society to establish democratic government under the sway of constitutional supremacy and the rule of law in order, amongst other things, to ensure transparency, accountability and responsiveness in the way courts and all organs of state function”. Corte Constitucional de Sudáfrica. Independent Newspapers (Pty) Ltd. v Minister for Intelligence Services CCT 38/07 (2008). Cfr. S. v Mamabolo CCT 44/00 (2001). “From the right to open justice flows the media’s right to gain access to, observe and report on, the administration of justice and the right to have access to papers and written arguments which are an integral part of court proceedings subject to such limitations as may be warranted on a case-by-case basis in order to ensure a fair trial”. Corte Constitucional de Sudáfrica. Independent Newspapers (Pty) Ltd. v Minister for Intelligence Services CCT 38/07 (2008). “Section 34 does not only protect the right of access to courts but also commands that courts deliberate in a public hearing. This guarantee of openness in judicial proceedings is again found in section 35(3)(c) which entitles every accused person to a public trial before an ordinary court”. Corte Constitucional de Sudáfrica. Independent Newspapers (Pty) Ltd. v Minister for Intelligence Services CCT 38/07 (2008). Cfr. S. v Mamabolo CCT 44/00 (2001): “The judiciary cannot function properly without the support and trust of the public. Therefore courts have over the centuries developed a method of functioning, a self-discipline and a restraint which, although it differs from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, has a number of essential characteristics. The most important is that judges speak in court and only in court. They are not at liberty to defend or even debate their decisions in public. It requires little imagination to appreciate that the alternative would be chaotic. Moreover, as a matter of general policy judicial proceedings of any significance are conducted in open court, to which everybody has free access and can assess the merits of the dispute and can witness the process of its resolution. This process of resolution ought as a matter of principle to be analytical, rational and reasoned. The rules to be applied in resolving the dispute should either be known beforehand or be debated and determined openly. All decisions of judicial bodies are as a matter of course announced in public; and, as a matter of virtually invariable practice, reasons are automatically and publicly given for judicial decisions in contested matters. All courts of any consequence are obliged to maintain records of their proceedings and to retain them for subsequent scrutiny. Ordinarily the decisions of courts are subject to correction by other, higher tribunals, once again for reasons that are debated and made known publicly”. “In our constitutional scheme a right entrenched in the Bill of Rights is certainly not absolute. Nor do we subscribe to a hierarchy of entrenched freedoms and fundamental rights. A right may be limited, but only in terms of a law of general application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom or by any other provision of the Constitution”. Corte Constitucional de Sudáfrica. SABC v NDPP, CCT 58/00 (2006). “[O]penness and accountability are underlying values of the Constitution and that, in accordance with the principle of open justice, the public should, as far as possible, be informed and aware of what takes place in our courts. Where a court exercises a discretion under section 173, it must ensure that if, in so doing, it impinges upon rights entrenched in chapter 2 of the Constitution, the extent of the impairment of rights is proportional to the purpose the court seeks to achieve. We do not need to consider here whether this is a section 36 limitation analysis or not. It is clear that it is a proportionality enquiry that a court exercising its section 173 powers must undertake”. Corte Constitucional de Sudáfrica. SABC v NDPP, CCT 58/00 (2006). “Pistorius contends that the live broadcasting of his criminal trial, through audio (radio), audio-visual (television) and still photographic means, will infringe his right to a fair trial (…)”. “The applicants, MultiChoice and Primedia, or their authorized representatives, [were] permitted to set up equipment in accordance with the specifications below to obtain a video and audio recording and/or transmission of the permitted portions (…) of the criminal trial of Oscar Leonard Pistorius under case number 13/25513”. Corte Suprema de Sudáfrica. Multichoice (pty) Ltd. v National Prosecution Authority, 10193/2014. Sentencia SU 274 de 2019. Id. Id. Sentencia SU 274 de 2019. Ley 906 de 2004, artículo

18. Ley 906 de 2004, artículos 149, 150 y

151. Ley 906 de 2004, artículo 149, parágrafo: “Principio de publicidad. (…) En las actuaciones procesales relativas a los delitos contra la libertad y formación sexual, violencia sexual y violencia intrafamiliar, el juez podrá, a solicitud de cualquiera de los intervinientes en el proceso, disponer la realización de audiencias cerradas al público. La negación de esta solicitud se hará mediante providencia motivada. Cuando cualquiera de los intervinientes en el proceso lo solicite, la autoridad competente podrá determinar la reserva de identidad respecto de los datos personales de la víctima, los de sus descendientes y los de cualquier otra persona que esté bajo su guarda o custodia”. Ley 906 de 2004, artículos 150: “Restricciones a la publicidad por motivos de orden público, seguridad nacional o moral pública. Cuando el orden público o la seguridad nacional se vean amenazados por la publicidad de un procedimiento en particular, o se comprometa la preservación de la moral pública, el juez mediante auto motivado, podrá imponer una o varias de las siguientes medidas:

1. Limitación total o parcial del acceso al público o a la prensa.

2. Imposición a los presentes del deber de guardar reserva sobre lo que ven, oyen o perciben”. Ley 906 de 2004, artículo 152A: “En aras de garantizar la vida e integridad personal de los testigos, el juez o el tribunal podrá decretar la prohibición de que sean fotografiados, o se capte su imagen a través de cualquier otro medio”. Ley 906 de 2004, artículo

149. Ley 906 de 2004, artículo

155. Ley 906 de 2004, artículo

18. Ley 1712 de 2014, artículo

3. Id. Id. Ley 1712 de 2014, artículo

5. Ley 1712 de 2014, artículo

28. Id. Ley 1712 de 2014, artículo

18. Ley 1712 de 2014, artículo

19. Ley 1712 de 2014, artículo

28. Sentencia SU 274 de 2019 Id. Id. Sentencia SU 274 de 2019. Sentencia SU 274 de 2019. Cfr. Sentencia Su 274 de 2019. Sentencia SU 274 de 2019. Id. Id. Cdno. 1, fl.

3. Sentencia SU 115 de 2018. “Este requisito no supone que la decisión cuestionada comporte necesariamente una irregularidad procesal, sino que la irregularidad que se alega por el tutelante tenga un efecto determinante en la providencia que se cuestiona”. Cfr. Sentencias SU 237 de 2019 y SU 074 de 2018. Sentencia SU 573 de 2019. Sentencia SU 424 de 2016. Cfr. Sentencia SU 479 de 2019. “La necesidad de que las decisiones de los jueces estén plenamente sustentadas en el marco jurídico aplicable y en los supuestos fácticos objeto de estudio, condujo a que la ausencia de motivación de la decisión judicial se convirtiera en una causal independiente de procedibilidad de la tutela contra sentencias, tras ser valorada, en varias ocasiones, como una hipótesis de defecto sustantivo o material”. Sentencia SU 659 de 2015. “Decisión sin motivación, es decir, cuando las determinaciones adoptadas en la parte resolutiva de la providencia y mediante las cuales se resuelve de fondo el asunto no encuentran en la parte motiva el fundamento o ratio decidendi, que permita a los destinatarios de las mismas ejercer un control sobre la razón de dichas decisiones y eventualmente controvertirlas”. Sentencia SU 379 de 2019. Cfr. Sentencia SU 113 de 2019. “Decisión sin motivación: se observa cuando los servidores judiciales no dan cuenta de los supuestos fácticos y jurídicos de sus decisiones en el entendido que precisamente en esa motivación reposa la legitimidad de su órbita funcional”. Sentencia SU 424 de 2014. Sentencia T-041 de 2018. Sentencia T-041 de 2018. Sentencia T-041 de 2018. Cfr. Sentencias C-590 de 2005 y T-233 de 2007, entre otras. Cdno. reservado, CD

1. Sentencia T-041 de 2018. Sentencias SU 115 de 2019 y SU 069 de 2018. “La jurisprudencia constitucional también ha decantado que la autonomía de los jueces encuentra un límite ante la relevancia del precedente en el ordenamiento jurídico colombiano y la garantía efectiva del derecho fundamental a la igualdad consagrado en el artículo 13 Superior, lo cual implica el derecho ciudadano a tener una interpretación y aplicación equivalente de la Ley”. Sentencia SU 479 de 2019. “El respeto del precedente jurisprudencial también se encuentra íntimamente ligado a la obligatoriedad de los fallos de tutela, lo cual emana precisamente del respeto por la institucionalidad y los valores y reglas que rigen el Estado social de derecho. Ello permite garantizar que las decisiones de los jueces no sean arbitrarias, caprichosas o que desconozcan la interpretación autorizada de la Carta Política”. Sentencia SU 115 de 2019. Sentencia SU 267 de 2019. Sentencia SU 267 de 2019. Sentencia SU 479 de 2019. Sentencia SU 210 de 2017. Sentencia SU 632 de 2017. Sentencias SU 242 de 2015 y SU 159 de 2002. Sentencia SU 115 de 2019. Sentencias T-462 de 2003 y T-842 de 2001. Sentencia SU 113 de 2018. Sentencia SU 627 de 2019. Sentencia SU 453 de 2019. Sentencia SU 113 de 2018. Sentencia T-142 de 2019. Sentencia T-319 de 2019. Id. Por ejemplo, en la sentencia T-008 de 2020, la Corte consideró que este defecto se configuraba, por cuanto el funcionario judicial “no tuvo en cuenta que el caso implicaba considerar la tensión entre los derechos de la niña a no ser revictimizada, por un lado, y de acceso a la administración de justicia, participar y que se tenga en cuenta su opinión en el proceso penal (…)”. Sentencia SU 226 de 2019. “Se trata de un verdadero defecto sustantivo porque se dio en un abierto desconocimiento del marco jurídico en materia de pensiones, de las obligaciones de los sujetos que participan de éste, de las consecuencias de su incumplimiento, y sobre todo del mandato constitucional según el cual las cargas negativas de las inobservancias del empleador o de las entidades administradoras, bajo ninguna circunstancia, pueden ser atribuidas al trabajador”. Sentencia T-360 de 2018. “(i) La decisión se fundamenta en una hermenéutica no sistémica de la norma, con omisión del análisis de otras disposiciones que regulan el caso. En el presente asunto la sentencia demandada dejó de lado el marco jurídico conforme con el cual resulta aplicable el tope pensional de 25 smlmv inclusive respecto de pensiones reconocidas en virtud del régimen de transición. Este marco se encuentra contemplado en el artículo 48 de la Constitución Política modificado por el Acto Legislativo 01 de 2005, la Ley 100 de 1993, el Decreto 691 de 1994, la Ley 797 de 2003, y la determinación del alcance normativo de estas disposiciones señalado mediante las Sentencias de Constitucionalidad C-089 de 1997, C-155 de 1997, C-258 de 2013, las Sentencias de Unificación SU 230 de 2015 y 210 de 2017 y las Sentencias de Sala de Revisión, entre estas las T-892 de 2013 y T-320 de 2015, conforme se explica a continuación”. Sentencia SU 072 de 2018. Sentencia T-391 de 2007. Id. Id. Corte Suprema de Justicia, Sala de Casación Penal. SP-6699-2014, Radicación No. 43524. Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos. Informe Anual, 2019. Ley 906 de 2004, artículo 149: “(…) El juez podrá limitar la publicidad de todos los procedimientos o parte de ellos, previa audiencia privada con los intervinientes, de conformidad con los artículos siguientes y sin limitar el principio de contradicción. // Estas medidas deberán sujetarse al principio de necesidad y si desaparecieren las causas que dieron origen a esa restricción, el juez la levantará de oficio o a petición de parte (…)”. Acuerdos PCSJA20-11517 de 15 de marzo de 2020, PCSJA20-11518 de 16 de marzo de 2020, PCSJA20-11519 de 16 de marzo de 2020, PCSJA20-11521 de 19 de marzo de 2020 , PCSJA20-11526 de 22 de marzo de 2020, PCSJA20-11532 de 11 de abril de 2020 y PCSJA20-11546 de 25 de abril de 2020. Auto 121 de 2020. Cno. de revisión, fls. 753 a

757. En este cuadro se consolidó la información reportada por los siguientes actores: Blu Radio (Cno. de revisión, fls. 283 a 290), Caracol Radio (Cno. de revisión, fls. 267 y 358 a 360), Caracol TV (Cno. de revisión, fls. 265), Florencio Sánchez (Cno. de revisión, fls. 175 a 178 y 411), Juan Carlo Giraldo (Cno. de revisión, fls. 172 a 174), Media Legal Defence Initiative (Cno. de revisión, fls. 546 a 555 y 575 a 584) y RCN (Cno. de revisión, fls. 269 a 278 y 303). Fundamento jurídico

89. Fundamento jurídico 95: “(…) la decisión de declarar la reserva de las audiencias preliminares se fundó en “en una hermenéutica no sistémica” de las causales de reserva previstas por el artículo 18 de la Ley 906 de 2004 y, por tanto, la Juez omitió “el análisis de otras normas que regulan el caso”, en particular, de las referidas libertades [de expresión, información y prensa]”. Fundamento jurídico

100. Fundamento jurídico

70. Fundamentos jurídicos 63, 64, 98 y siguientes. Se refiere a las causales de restricción provistas por el Legislador en los artículos 18, 150, 151 y 152 de la Ley 906 de 2004. Ley 906 de 2004, artículo

149. Fundamento jurídico 80, literal (iv). Corte Constitucional, sentencia SU-274 de 2019, fundamentos 64 a

69. Constitución de 1991, artículos: 29, 228 y

230. Convención Americana de Derechos Humanos, artículo

8. Constitución Política, artículos 228 y 230; Convención Americana de Derechos Humanos (CADH), artñiculo

8. Fundamento jurídico 96, en desarrollo de lo señalado por la mayoría en los fundamentos 40 y

41. Sobre la protección incremental ver: Corte Constitucional, sentencias SU-274 de 2019 y C-599 de 2019. Convención Americana de Derechos Humanos, ratificada por Ley 16 de 1972. Pacto Internacional de Derechos Civiles y Políticos, ratificado por Ley 74 de 1968. El artículo 14 del PIDs dispone que “La prensa y el público podrán ser excluidos de la totalidad o parte de los juicios por consideraciones de moral, orden público o seguridad nacional en una sociedad democrática, o cuando lo exija el interés de la vida privada de las partes o, en la medida estrictamente necesaria en opinión del tribunal, cuando por circunstancias especiales del asunto la publicidad pudiera perjudicar a los intereses de la justicia; pero toda sentencia en materia penal o contenciosa será pública, excepto en los casos en que el interés de menores de edad exija lo contrario, o en las acusaciones referentes a pleitos matrimoniales o a la tutela de menores”. Corte Constitucional, sentencias SU-274 de 2019 y C-599 de 2019, entre otras.